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Abstract 
This paper considers the international and regional economic institutional environment 
within which the economies of Northeast Asia interact. One conclusion is that there are sufficient 
mutual economic relationships to think of Northeast Asia as a distinctive economic region. This is 
true both in terms of a narrow geographic definition—Japan, China, Mongolia, Russia, South 
Korea, North Korea—and a broader definition including Hong Kong and Taiwan. A second 
conclusion is that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the single most important institution 
globally for these economies. The major regional WTO issue is China's accession to membership. 
It is clearly in everyone's interest that China become a member and thereby increasingly integrated 
into the world economy, but membership should be on terms that will bring its trade policies into 
conformity with WTO standards and procedures within a stipulated acceptable time period. 
Most of the paper is about the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and its 
potential regional institutional role. There are a number of issues which must be resolved if APEC 
is to successfully implement its future policy agenda of trade and investment liberalization, 
facilitation, and economic development. Various approaches are assessed in light of the free rider 
problem and timing concerns. Trade liberalization is the most contentious issue, given the lack of 
consensus on MFN treatment for non-APEC members, and the unwillingness of some members to 
engage in formal, comprehensive, and substantive trade negotiations. A new approach to trade 
liberalization, based on voluntary liberalization and peer group pressure has been proposed, 
termed "concerted unilateral liberalization." Whether it will succeed depends on how willing 
APEC members are to reach substantive, concrete agreements to implement the vision enunciated 
at Bogor in 1994 of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 for developed 
economy members and by 2020 for the developing members. 
* This paper has benefitted from comments by Alexander Rogojine, Zhan Shiliang, Chyuan-jeng 
Shiau and other participants in the Conference on Prospects for International Cooperation in 
Northeast Asia, and especially from Charles Morrison as well as Patricia Thayer. 
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The Northeast Asian economies engage in a wide range of economic transactions with 
each other, centering on trade but increasingly including foreign direct investment, technology 
transfer, bilateral and multilateral official development assistance, and private portfolio capital 
flows. This is true in terms both of a narrow geographic definition ~ Japan, China, Mongolia, 
Russia, South Korea, North Korea — and a broader definition which includes Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. If the United States is included, it changes the picture dramatically since it is such a large 
trading partner for all the Northeast Asian economies. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide some basic facts on economic size and on bilateral trade flows 
among these economies.1 They report what is well known: Japan, China, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan are major exporters and importers. However, with the exception of Mongolia 
most of their trade is not with each other as a group, but with the United States, the European 
Union, Southeast Asia, and the rest of the world. Moreover, unlike the ASEAN economies, 
foreign direct investment flows into and among Northeast Asian economies have been severely 
limited by host country policies and economic conditions, though China is becoming an 
increasingly important exception. Nonetheless, there are not sufficient mutual economic 
relationships to think of Northeast Asia as a distinctive economic region. Perhaps for political 
reasons even more than economic, no one has seriously proposed any form of a comprehensive 
1
 Trade data for Russia are not included since very little of its total trade is with the other 
Northeast Asian economies and it is not possible for me to estimate its Siberian and Maritime 
Provinces trade separately. North Korea data are not readily available. Neither materially affect 
the discussion. 
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Northeast Asian economic regional institution. Economic forces are simply allowed to work, and 
they have been effective. 
This does not mean that Northeast Asia is unimportant economically, politically, or in 
terms of institution-building and rules making. After all, it is the locus of two of the four 
dominant players in the Asia-Pacific, Japan and China; the United States and the ASEAN group 
of nations are the other two. Economic transactions and activities do not occur in a vacuum. 
They are carried out under rules, procedures, and business arrangements determined by national 
governments, international and regional governmental institutions, and regimes shaped by 
international agreements or customary practices. These set the "rules of the game" for the 
markets in which business enterprises engage in foreign (and domestic) transactions with each 
other. Moreover, international institutions provide a litmus test of the policies and commitments 
of members and potential members toward the institution and toward each other. My purpose 
here is to consider the international and regional economic institutions and regimes in which the 
Northeast Asian economies currently or potentially participate. Following a brief survey of the 
full panoply, I focus particularly on issues involving two trade-related institutions, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO, the successor to GATT) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC), and one potential institution, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). 
The WTO is the single most important global economic institution. It was created January 
1, 1995 under the Uruguay Round to absorb and strengthen GATT, the institutional foundation of 
the world trading system which embodies the long postwar history of setting the rules for trade 
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among market-oriented economies, and trade liberalization on an unconditional Most-Favored-
Nation (MFN) basis. Among its many provisions the WTO expands coverage to services, 
strengthens the possible actions against domestic subsidies which distort trade, and provides 
enhanced dispute settlements procedures.2 Within Northeast Asia, however, China, Taiwan, 
Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea are not members of the WTO, as is discussed below. 
There are Asian-Pacific and Asian regional and subregional governmental trade-oriented 
organizations, but none has great economic impact yet on the Northeast Asian economies. The 
U.N.'s Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), located in Bangkok, 
includes all Asian economies; it has not played a major economic role. ASEAN, the Association 
of Southeast Asian States, has been economically successful primarily by agglomerating and 
coordinating the bargaining power of its members in dealing with Japan, China, the United States, 
and the European Union. That power has been reflected in ASEAN's negotiations with Japan on 
economic aid and in the formation and development of APEC. The ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), established in 1993, aims to eliminate tariff barriers among the participant Southeast 
Asian members over the next 10-15 years.3 The potentially important issues are whether trade 
liberalization policies will be extended more broadly (APEC or the entire world), which seems 
likely; and the extent to which the prospects of participating in intra-regional trade — the making 
2See Jeffrey J. Schott, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, November 1994). 
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 A useful reader, encompassing selections on a range of topics and institutions, is Ross 
Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, editors, Asia Pacific Regionalism - Readings in International 
Economic Relations (Pymble, Australia: Harper Educational Publishers, 1994). 
of components and parts in one ASEAN country and assembly in another — will attract foreign 
direct investment from Japanese, South Korean, and other firms, which in fact is already 
happening in automobiles, consumer electronics, and office equipment. 
Capital flows to and from the Northeast Asian economies are of increasing importance, 
and Japan plays a central role. Capital flows are of four types: bilateral official development 
assistance (ODA), mainly from Japan; multilateral government institutional loans from the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB); private investment portfolio capital through loans 
and purchases of equities and bonds; and foreign direct investment by transnational enterprises 
(TNEs). The World Bank, with U.S. leadership, plays a significant development financing role 
globally. The ADB, with Japanese leadership, plays a similar regional role. Both lend 
substantially to China, and are also important for Mongolia. North Korea, living in self-imposed 
isolation, is not a member of either institution. Taiwan, excluded from the World Bank, is a 
member of the ADB under the nomenclature Taipei China, and is a donor rather than a loan 
recipient. 
Two private, market-based global regimes are very important for Northeast Asia and for 
the world: the foreign exchange market system and the private world capital markets system. 
The roles of governments are limited primarily to determining the nature and degree of access of 
their financial institutions and business enterprises to these markets. 
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, in the early 1970s, 
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supply and demand in currency markets have determined the exchange rates among the world's 
major currencies, notably the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, and German Deutsche mark. The 
Deutsche mark is the anchor for a fixed exchange rate system among most continental Western 
European nations. Most other smaller economies, including all those in Northeast Asia except 
Japan, have pegged their respective currencies either to the dollar or to a weighted average in 
which the dollar is predominant. The sustained appreciation of the yen relative to the dollar over 
the past several years, and particularly in spring 1995, has caused great concern in Japan, 
threatening to halt the recovery from long recession so slowly underway during the past year. It 
is a mixed blessing for other Northeast (and Southeast) Asian economies, providing their 
industries a competitive boost vis-a-vis Japanese rivals but also increasing their costs of servicing 
yen-denominated debt as their currencies have declined with the dollar. Japanese policymakers 
want international exchange rate system reform to be given high priority, but it is not clear what 
can actually be achieved. Basically, establishment of a stable yen/dollar rate in a competitive 
equilibrium in the near run requires expansionary macroeconomic policies in Japan and budget 
deficit reduction (resulting in higher national savings) in the United States. In the longer run it 
requires a commitment to better coordinated macroeconomic policies by the two nations. This 
has been a serious problem for several years; policy makers (executive and legislative) in neither 
country have been willing to pay the attendant political prices. In the longer run, should the 
perception persist that the yen will remain strong, it will make creation of and membership in a 
yen bloc more attractive to some Northeast Asian, and other Asian, economies. 
Moreover, U.S. and Japanese perceptions differ substantially both as to the sources of the 
unexpected yen appreciation in March-April 1995 to close to 80 yen/dollar, and as to what should 
be done. The realities are that the weak dollar is not yet hurting the U.S. economy, so there is 
little incentive for the U.S. government to take action; that Japan is being hurt by the yen 
appreciation; and that the Japanese government has not yet taken effective action to reverse the 
trend. These perceptions were clear at the APEC Finance Ministers meeting April 14-16, 1995. 
Incidentally, that consultative forum is not likely to be the locus for exchange rate system reform, 
which more likely would be considered under G-7 or IMF auspices. 
The world capital market is founded on free, unrestricted short-term and long-term capital 
flows among the major national capital markets of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. 
It is a wholesale market of large-scale financial transactions among financial institutions and large 
industrial corporations. Its core is the Euro-currency market for bonds and loans, located mainly 
in London. This market developed independently of governments, although governments 
supervise and regulate participating institutions domiciled in their respective countries; its market-
determined interests rates establish the world's basic interest rate structure. The world capital 
market has become an increasingly important source of borrowing by creditworthy Northeast 
Asian governments and large industrial enterprises. 
The WTO and China's Membership 
The major WTO issue for Northeast Asia is China's accession, with its attendant rights and 
responsibilities. China's effort to obtain membership is both a political issue and an economic 
issue; I focus here on the latter. The WTO, like its predecessor GATT, is based upon market 
mechanisms and free trade principles on an unconditional Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) basis. 
Planned economies were excluded from GATT. While China's economic reform policies have 
emphasized privatization and markets, and have made considerable progress, the rules and 
institutional arrangements for foreign trade still constitute major barriers and problems. It is 
clearly in the long-run interest not only of China but of all economies that China become a WTO 
member and be increasingly integrated into the world economy. The key issue for China's 
membership is how far it must bring its trade practices into conformity with international 
standards and procedures, and how rapidly. 
Negotiations over China's membership are politically sensitive and at times tense. They 
involve a wide range of complex issues. The United States has taken the lead in insisting that 
China substantially increase market access (tariffs and quotas are high); make rules, regulations, 
procedures, and policies transparent (currently opaque); and take related measures to conform 
more with international practices.4 In mid-April the European Union joined in informing China 
that it must make major concessions along these lines before it can be accepted into the WTO. 
Both American and European government concerns are influenced by increasingly large bilateral 
trade deficits with China. Chinese negotiators have argued that China is making rapid progress in 
privatization and trade liberalization, and it cannot be expected to accomplish everything at once. 
4
 For articulation of a relatively tough position, see Gregory J. Mostel, "China and the 
WTO" (Washington: Economic Strategy Institute, November 1994); for an argument that the 
United States should work for China's early entry, see Nicholas Lardy, China in the World 
Economy (Washington: Institute of International Economics, April 1994). 
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It demands developing country status, which would exempt or substantially delay its required 
liberalization. American and European policymakers apparently oppose granting China blanket 
developing country status without countervailing commitments to ensure that China will not 
become an enormous free rider on the world trading system. 
Like other developing economies, China pursues an industrial policy to support future 
growth industries; this is particularly important given the actual and potential size of its domestic 
market. The policy encompasses a wide range of industries, and is epitomized by the automobile 
industry. An important industrial policy instrument is protection of the domestic producers from 
import competition, counter to the intent and thrust of WTO trade liberalization objectives. On 
the other hand, unlike Japan and South Korea China has encouraged selected foreign direct 
investment in its automobile industry on its own terms. How the contradictions between 
industrial policy and trade liberalization policy are reconciled, or balanced compromises struck, is 
an important issue. 
A related issue is accession of Taiwan to WTO membership, which it eagerly seeks as a 
developed economy. Taiwan is applying as a "customs territory," a concept earlier used for 
colonies and under which Hong Kong long ago became a GATT/WTO member. Taiwan has 
proposed a substantial liberalization package in order to be accepted.5 Having met the economic 
obligations, the decision on Taiwan's membership is essentially political, tied to the decision on 
5
 "What Price Glory?," Far Eastern Economic Review (April 6, 1995, pp. 66-67), briefly 
reviews Taiwan's proposed concessions, and their anticipated effects on the Taiwanese economy. 
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China. China does not want Taiwan to be accepted into membership before China becomes a 
member. This may become a political problem if China decides to postpone its application for 
admission in light of what it determines to be unacceptable conditions, but it may also be a source 
of leverage on China by its major WTO interlocutors - the E.U. and the U.S. — which may 
threaten to move forward on Taiwan's application in order to put pressure on China. Whereas 
China has apparently regarded WTO membership as a political issue involving its "acceptance" 
into the international economic community, its negotiating partners, especially the U.S., have 
argued that it is a matter of China's having accepted the legal obligations required to bring its 
trade regime to WTO standards. They know that once membership is granted, the ability of 
outsiders to push further reforms in China's trade regime will markedly decrease. 
A related potential WTO issue is utilization of its new dispute settlement mechanism, 
substantially strengthened over the weak GATT provisions. It is desirable, politically and for 
economic institution-building, that economies settle bilateral disputes through the WTO 
mechanism rather than relying on unilateral retaliation. However, it is not clear whether and 
under what circumstances members will decide to avail themselves of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. This may be tested shortly as the United States-Japan automotive and auto parts 
trade negotiations are played out, since both sides are threatening to take aspects of the dispute to 
the WTO. 
APEC: A New Approach to Trade Liberalization? 
The basic objectives of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), created in 
1989, are to promote and facilitate, through liberalization of the rules for trade and investment 
flows, the development and growth of its members; and to do so in ways which not only conform 
to WTO rules but are supportive of the multilateral, global WTO system. In a very real sense 
APEC is a governmental institutional reaction to the economic realities of the substantial and 
increasing regional economic integration, led by private businesses operating through markets.6 
Businesses and governments alike seek to increase market access and to reduce transactions costs 
by improvements in the rules of the game engineered by APEC. An APEC core concept is "open 
regionalism," which in its pure form means that any trade liberalizations arranged among APEC 
members will be extended on a non-discriminatory, unconditional MFN basis to all WTO 
members. Since this creates free rider problems, especially vis-a-vis the European Union, the 
United States and Canada (among others) have not been willing to accept this concept fully, as 
discussed below.7 
Unlike the WTO, of the Northeast Asian economies only Mongolia, North Korea and 
Russia are not among the eighteen members of APEC. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (termed 
Chinese Taipei) joined at the Seoul meeting in 1991 as a result of successful negotiations handled 
6
 Together, the APEC economies comprise about one-half of world gross domestic 
product measured at exchange rates, though two-thirds consists of the United States and Japan. 
APEC exports are close to one-half the world total; about two-thirds of APEC member trade is 
with each other. 
7
 A broader definition of open regionalism, involving a bundle of policy changes which 
reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and to investment flows on a non-discriminatory 
basis through consensus, is given in Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Pacific Economic 
Development Report 1995 (Singapore: PECC Secretariat, 1994), p 27. 
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by South Korea. Currently a two-year moratorium on new members is in effect until 1996. The 
Indochinese states are front-runners in any expansion of membership, followed by Russia, Peru 
and Colombia; India has also expressed interest in membership. Inevitably Japan and China play 
major roles in APEC together with the United States and ASEAN, as already noted. In addition, 
by virtue of their substantive policy proposals as well as economic size both South Korea and 
Australia are significant players. 
APEC is a governmental institution at the Ministerial level. It is a young organization 
which has made considerable progress since its inception in 1989. To date it has been a 
consultative arrangement, based on annual ministerial meetings, and more frequent meetings of 
senior officials. So far it is administratively lean and simple. A small APEC Secretariat was set 
up in Singapore following the fourth meeting in 1992. Working Groups and two policy 
committees develop policy proposals and suggest modes of cooperation in a range of specific 
areas, sometimes in cooperation with PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), an active 
organization of business and academic leaders and government officials "in their private capacity." 
APEC established the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in 1992, consisting of one private 
citizen from most members to develop a vision of APEC's long-run objectives and modes of 
operation. Its reports for the 1993 meeting in Seattle and the 1994 meeting in Indonesia provided 
an intellectual framework for approaching many of the concrete issues that APEC must ultimately 
face.8 The EPG, under its energetic American chairman C. Fred Bergsten, also became the setting 
where differences in concepts and approaches have been most forcefully articulated. Their 
deliberations have reflected substantial differences in substance and style among the APEC 
members, as well as diverse levels of development, economic systems, and size. The United 
States government is eager to achieve results quickly. It, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Hong 
Kong and perhaps some others prefer to achieve trade liberalization through formal negotiations 
in the traditional way. Many Asian countries, including Japan, China, and many ASEAN 
members, prefer a more informal style, less contractual and less binding approaches, and reliance 
on peer pressure and moral force rather than treaty sanctions. The latter approach emphasizes 
confidence-building as a prior step in institution-building, and tends to shy away from issues that 
may be confrontational. 
The two most recent meetings have moved APEC dramatically forward. At Blake Island, 
Washington in November 1993, President Clinton in effect raised APEC to the highest 
governmental level by convening an informal leaders meeting of the heads of government 
following the APEC Ministerial meeting. That summit also exposed political difficulties facing 
APEC. China successfully insisted that Taiwan's President and Hong Kong's Governor not be 
invited; and Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia refused to attend. At Bogor in November 1994, 
with the strong leadership of President Soeharto, the leaders committed themselves to achieving 
free and open trade and investment no later than 2010 for the industrialized economies and no 
8
 See, in particular, the Second Report of the Eminent Persons Group, Achieving the 
APEC Vision - Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, August 
1994). 
later than 2020 for the developing economies. This was a political rather than binding legal 
commitment, but with strong moral intent and peer pressure; and the leaders also agreed to work 
on a blueprint or agenda for implementation, a task their senior officials are now struggling to 
carry out. The biggest challenge facing the November 1995 APEC meeting at Osaka and 
probably several subsequent meetings as well is that of developing a long-term framework for 
implementing the Bogor vision. 
The APEC policy agenda has three main interrelated components: trade and foreign direct 
investment liberalization; facilitation of trade and other economic transactions; and economic 
"cooperation" or promotion of the economic development of the developing APEC members. 
The economic development component includes human resource development through education 
and training, science and technology transfer, tourism, and infrastructure projects in transport, 
telecommunications, and energy. Japan is the major foreign aid provider in APEC. Facilitation 
includes the simplification, standardization, and (where possible) harmonization of product 
standards and testing procedures, customs procedures, reduction of administrative barriers, 
greater transparency, and similar more or less technical matters which are not of high visibility and 
politically less controversial, but in practice significant in reducing transactions costs. 
The most difficult policy issues are how actually to implement trade and investment 
liberalization. This is the thorny agenda item placed in the hands of the Japanese government as 
host of the 1995 APEC meeting. What should the basic approach be; what about unconditional 
versus conditional MFN; how can APEC be not only WTO-consistent but WTO-supportive; how 
should the differences in levels of development be dealt with? 
APEC has rejected the establishment of a Pacific free trade association (FTA) since, by 
reducing trade barriers only among members, an FTA discriminates against non-members, is trade 
diverting and, though allowed, often is not ultimately supportive of WTO objectives and 
principles. AFT A runs counter to the principle of open regionalism, embodying unconditional 
MFN. Many APEC economies, including Japan, appear willing to extend any APEC-based trade 
liberalizations on an unconditional MFN basis. However, as already noted, the United States, 
Canada and some others are unwilling to extend on an unconditional non-reciprocal basis any 
reductions in trade barriers to the European Union, not only on free rider grounds but because 
that would sharply reduce EU incentives to participate in a new global round of trade negotiations 
and thus, in their minds, not be conducive to future WTO liberalization. The U.S. position is not 
surprising, since it has a very large market and great bargaining power, unlike smaller economies 
with far less bargaining power. 
How, then, to proceed? The Second EPG report proposes a four-pronged approach by 
member countries: engaging in unilateral liberalization; making an APEC commitment to reduce 
barriers to non-members on a MFN basis while achieving region-wide free trade; extending 
benefits of APEC liberalization to non-members on a mutual reciprocal basis (conditional MFN); 
and allowing any individual APEC member unilaterally to extend its APEC liberalization to non-
members on either an unconditional or conditional basis. This package papers over the lack of 
consensus on MFN by allowing members to behave differently. 
Although Americans often perceive the trade liberalization process to involve negotiated 
mutual concession among economies, in practice a large majority of the APEC economies have 
engaged in substantial unilateral deregulation and liberalization policy packages in recent years, 
including in Northeast Asia Japan, China, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan. This is textbook 
economics: an economy on net balance benefits from its own trade liberalization even if its 
partner does not liberalize. Of course it benefits more if its partners also liberalize; those are the 
benefits of the WTO and APEC. However, when its bargaining power is small it makes sense to 
liberalize unilaterally. It is textbook politics, however, that liberalization is economically costly to 
previously-protected, entrenched, organized interests — mainly domestic producers of import -
competing goods ~ who will attempt to impose political costs upon those making the decision to 
liberalize. The practical question, accordingly, is how much further will countries liberalize 
unilaterally without external pressures and benefits? 
China, Malaysia and Thailand prefer a purely unilateral approach, since they want 
flexibility and the ability to protect domestic industries until they become internationally 
competitive. That position is unlikely to be acceptable. In contrast, the United States, Canada, 
Mexico, Singapore and Hong Kong want GATT-like negotiations, with firm timetables and 
enforceable commitments. Others do not want to go that far. Indonesia has proposed a middle 
way, "concerted unilateral liberalization." 
Three of the four approaches are based on the assumption that there will be APEC-wide 
liberalization. They allow for divergence among members in application of the open regionalism 
principle. While the EPG pragmatic compromise approach was not specifically endorsed in the 
Bogor Declaration, it may well serve as the basis for proposals put on the agenda at Osaka. 
A different approach to the free rider problem, which minimizes it, has been proposed 
independently by Ross Garnaut of Australia and Paul Wonnacott of the United States: to 
negotiate trade liberalization initially on those products for which the APEC economies as a group 
are predominant suppliers to the world market (including each other); and to extend the 
liberalization on an unconditional MFN basis to all countries, since in practice other countries are 
small suppliers. Products for which APEC has a world market share of 80 percent or more 
comprise 19 percent of APEC's exports and 16 percent of its imports.9 An alternative would be 
to negotiate liberalization of major product categories where trade is primarily among APEC 
members; electronics equipment is a good candidate. 
It is particularly difficult for APEC to define a concrete action plan to implement trade 
liberalization. The traditional procedure ~ to enter formal trade negotiations among members, to 
trade concessions, to set timetables, and to sign and ratify a legally binding treaty — does not seem 
to be acceptable. That has been the American approach in past trade negotiations and earlier 
certainly was the preferred procedure in its approach to APEC. However, the Republican 
Congressional victory in the November 1994 elections certainly means that is not now possible for 
the President to obtain fast-track trade negotiation enabling legislation under which Congress can 
9
 Paul Wonnacott, "Merchandise Trade in the APEC region: Scope for MFN 
Liberalization?" Working Papers on Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation #94-3 (Washington: 
Institute for International Economies). 
only accept or reject ratification of any ensuing treaty without the power to amend it. Indeed, 
even earlier in the fall it appeared that support for further fast-track legislation was waning among 
some influential Democratic members of Congress as well as Republicans. More important, most 
of the Asian countries (including, I understand, Japan and China) oppose entering formal 
negotiations resulting in a legally binding agreement; they prefer instead a more informal, 
consultative progress to achieve consensus on the degree and pace of liberalization. 
The concept of "concerted unilateral liberalization" develops a new approach to trade 
negotiations. Each country will unilaterally develop its own liberalization program, and bring it to 
the APEC table for discussion and consultation. No doubt each country will be criticized for 
being laggard, and will be asked to do more, particularly in its sensitive or difficult areas. This 
mode of "negotiation" (perhaps better termed consultation) relies primarily on peer pressure, 
though no doubt understandings would be reached as to what in effect will be mutual concessions. 
Each country would then revise its program, and announce it. As I understand it, these 
consensual decisions for each country to liberalize unilaterally are consistent with WTO 
provisions so long as the country does so on an unconditional MFN basis. Discriminatory 
treatment of non-members is acceptable under GATT Article 24 only where a free trade area is 
established which involves liberalization of substantially all trade. It is not clear how, in such an 
arrangement, under WTO rules the United States or other countries could "unilaterally" extend 
concessions only to other APEC members while requiring reciprocity (conditional MFN) from 
non-members. 
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On first appearance, this seems to be a recipe for inaction because there are no legal 
commitments and no enforcement mechanisms. Since the procedure depends critically upon peer 
pressure, it remains to be seen how vigorously economies would liberalize under "concerted 
unilateral liberalization." Nonetheless, unilateral liberalization by one member has competitive 
effects on the policies of others. It was not mere coincidence that Indonesia announced a 
liberalization of its foreign direct investment regime in early June 1994 following U.S. delinking of 
its human rights policies and its application of MFN status toward China. And Indonesia's May 
1995 announcement of a specified schedule of tariff reductions is a signal, perhaps a goad, to 
other APEC members. The viability of APEC in the longer run requires all members to liberalize 
trade and investment, and no one wants to be seen as undermining APEC. 
A further issue is the timing for reaching the commitment to free trade and investment 
flows in the Pacific. The Bogor Declaration stated that advanced industrialized economies should 
achieve this goal by 2010, while the less developed ones have until 2020. This represents a 
continuation of the "special and differential" treatment embedded in GATT, though under attack 
in recent years as no longer required for any but the poorest nations. Certainly the U.S., Japan, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are in the 2010 group. It appears that China, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea expect to be in the 2020 group. It is reasonable that 
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile will be in the 2010 group; and Soeharto 
has expressed his hope that Indonesia will be as well. The 2010 group comprised four-fifths of 
APEC exports to each other in 1993; on the other hand, present trade barriers are much higher in 
the 2020 group, so the potential for trade growth through liberalization is greater. 
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The time sequence of the liberalization process is a concrete issue that has to be 
addressed. There will surely be a grace period of several years before any APEC-wide 
liberalization process begins. Will liberalization proceed in equal annual amounts, will it be 
greater in earlier years, or greater in later years? 
Considerable progress will be made at the Osaka APEC meeting, though less than the 
United States is seeking. (By definition it will be a success, since no one — except perhaps 
Malaysia — wants APEC to fail.) It is unlikely that the Japanese Prime Minister will exercise 
personal and political leadership like Soeharto or Clinton; that should not be expected in light of 
usual Japanese low-key approaches to diplomacy and leadership opportunities. However, 
Soeharto evidently continues to play a central role; he wants to see the Bogor Declaration 
implemented. 
At the February 1995 APEC senior officials preparatory meeting in Fukuoka, Japanese 
officials proposed a Partners for Progress program which placed primary emphasis on the 
developmental component of the APEC agenda, including allocation of some of its ODA funds to 
the APEC Secretariat. This was responsive to ASEAN pressures to expand and transform 
Japan's foreign aid program, but was criticized in that it intruded North-South, donor-recipient 
issues into the APEC process. However, to the extent that the developmental component of the 
APEC policy agenda is addressed, to some degree that is inevitable. Following the February 
meeting the Japanese senior officials set in place a process to elicit by June inputs from the other 
APEC members, on the basic themes of liberalization, facilitation and cooperation, and established 
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two frameworks — senior officials meetings (SOMs) and special SOMs — leading to a blueprint 
for the Osaka meeting. It is too early to know the substance of the action plan blueprint, how 
much progress will be made, and how the lack of consensus on certain key issues will be dealt 
with. 
My expectations are that concrete progress will be made at the Osaka conference on 
training and other developmental agenda items and in a number of facilitation areas. There will 
probably be agreement on the general principles of an overall trade liberalization action plan, with 
specifics to be decided at subsequent meetings. Since it was agreed upon in principle at Bogor, 
there will probably be a decision on a timetable for accelerating the Uruguay Round commitments 
(even though China and Taiwan are not signatories). That alone would be a significant step. 
My overall evaluation of APEC is positive. It is beneficial to all its members. Perhaps its 
most important substantive contribution in the near future will be in the facilitation of trade and 
related economic transactions, where opportunities for simplifying procedures and reducing 
transactions costs abound. Its developmental activities are certainly useful, though perhaps they 
would occur anyway. Trade liberalization is the most contentious and difficult issue, especially 
given the lack of APEC consensus on unconditional versus conditional MFN treatment of non-
members. Moreover, some countries — certainly Malaysia and perhaps China — are reluctant to 
engage in concrete, substantive, comprehensive APEC trade discussions. For China, its APEC 
negotiations must be significantly dependent upon the outcome of its negotiations to enter the 
WTO. Japanese officials have expressed reservations about agriculture. Much depends on how 
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willing APEC members are to put peer pressure on each other, and to respond to the pressure 
they receive. 
At this stage the APEC process is just as important as the results. The APEC Ministerial 
and leader summit meetings, and the preparations for them, are important in themselves. They 
build knowledge, trust, and confidence; raise consciousness of each other's circumstances; and 
develop networks. Moreover, movement is in the right direction; the goals are highly desirable. 
And it should not be forgotten that APEC is young, and its processes and institutional 
arrangements are still fragile. 
APEC has been particularly important for the United States, and for those desiring active 
American involvement in Asia. APEC has provided a coherent, region-wide focus to U.S. Asian 
economic policy. It provides another mechanism for liberalizing trade and expanding market 
access. It potentially mitigates the heavy U.S. reliance on bilateral economic negotiations. And it 
has been an important education in Asia for U.S. government officials from the President on 
down. There are now APEC offices in every relevant U.S. government department, and a very 
competent U.S. Ambassador-designate to APEC, a new position. 
Of course APEC is far from a panacea; it cannot resolve all regional economic issues. 
Some have gone so far as to say that APEC is irrelevant, others that it is potentially dangerous. 
One strand arguing irrelevance says that Asian-Pacific economic integration is market-led (which 
is correct) and that governments have no significant role (incorrect). Establishing rules and 
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harmonizing them is a key role governments can play in the building of market institutions. 
Another strand of argument is that the really key economic issues are not region-wide but bilateral 
and triangular, among China, Japan, and the United States. These are certainly very important 
relationships that probably will continue to be managed directly; however, it is possible that the 
larger audience of other APEC members will have a mediating influence. 
The potential danger of APEC is that it might become an inward-looking, discriminatory 
trading bloc which thereby undermines the global role of the WTO. That is not going to happen. 
All APEC members well understand that they benefit most of all from a liberal, open global 
trading system, and they will do nothing to undermine the WTO. Rather, they correctly see 
APEC's role to be complementary to and supportive of the WTO. This underlies the emphasis on 
open regionalism, and the rejection of a free trade area. In trade facilitation and in other areas it 
serves as a negotiating (or consultative) laboratory for new issues not yet dealt with by the WTO. 
Most importantly, APEC is very likely to be the source of efforts to enter, in due course, the next 
round of global trade liberalization negotiations ~ maybe even termed the APEC Round. 
Challenges to APEC 
APEC faces challenges from two potential alternative institutions: the East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), and the Western hemisphere "Free Trade Area of the Americas." 
Both contradict the goals of APEC. 
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The EAEC was initially proposed by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia to encompass 
the Southeast Asian ASEAN nations, and in Northeast Asia China, Japan, and South Korea. This 
proposed organization is explicitly Asian; it excludes Australia and New Zealand as well as the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico. Mahathir's stated purpose is to have a consultative forum to 
discuss economic problems and free trade issues. The way Mahathir has presented the EAEC 
concept, for instance at his UN speech in 1991, has been clearly racist: anti-white, anti-Western. 
However, that certainly does not mean that other supporters of the EAEC concept see it in such 
racist terms. 
U.S. policy makers have reacted in a strongly negative way to the EAEC proposal, only in 
part for emotional or anti-racist reasons. They see it as divisive, at the least diverting attention 
and effort from APEC and at worst undermining APEC and its objectives. There is concern that a 
negative Congressional reaction would make it more difficult to fight protectionism targeted 
toward Asia. Moreover, Japanese participation in EAEC would weaken the U.S.-Japan 
relationship, and raise the spectre of a new-style Japanese Asian co-prosperity sphere. 
Indeed, EAEC's purposes remain unclear. Its most credible potential role is as a threat: 
that if the U.S. moves away from APEC, East and Southeast Asian nations are prepared to move 
ahead on their own. More benignly, since APEC has in fact become the authoritative dialogue 
mechanism, if an Asian (or Western Pacific) caucus were to form which was not only APEC 
compatible but APEC supportive, it might not be so bad. The difficulty remains, nonetheless, that 
Mahathir has used the EAEC concept to reduce rather than enhance trust and confidence. 
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Credibility requires economic power, namely the participation of both China and Japan in 
EAEC. China had expressed willingness to participate, which is not surprising. Japan has been 
caught in an in-between position. On the one hand it wants to improve and deepen its relations 
with other Asian nations; on the other hand it wants to maintain its fundamentally close 
relationship with the United States. Japan would like to do both, serving (in its own perspective) 
as a bridge. However, EAEC is an either/or, not both/and choice. American policymakers and 
analysts view Japan's participation in EAEC as a turning away from the United States. In April 
1995 Japan decided not to attend a proposed meeting in Thailand only of Asian economic and 
trade Ministers after Malaysia vetoed its proposal that Ministers from Australia and New Zealand 
be invited as well. Fearful that the meeting will be interpreted as the formation of an Asian-only 
caucus (EAEC), Japan decided to defer its participation.10 This suggests, however, that Japan 
might be willing to participate in a Western Pacific Economic Caucus in which Australia and New 
Zealand were also members.11 
The other challenge to APEC is the commitment of 34 Western Hemisphere democracies 
to negotiate a comprehensive "Free Trade Area of the Americas" made at the Miami summit 
10
 "Japan Snubs Asia in a Bow to U.S.," International Herald Tribune, April 15-16, 1995, 
pp. 9-10. 
11
 At the Conference on Prospects for Cooperation in Northeast Asia, a Japanese former 
senior official suggested that Japanese participation in EAEC would be possible only if it were 
correctly perceived as being within and supportive of APEC, and not regionally divisive. 
Specifically, Australia and New Zealand should be included; Hong Kong and Taiwan, as members 
of APEC, should be included; and the EAEC have very clear rules of transparency and could be 
correctly perceived as not undermining Japan's relations with the United States. 
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meeting in December 1994, three weeks after the Bogor APEC meeting.12 This was a result of 
the earlier United States Initiative of the Americas. A Western hemisphere free trade area is in 
seeming conflict with the U.S. commitment to APEC. The Western Pacific economies are far 
more important economic partners for the United States than Latin America, (aside from Mexico 
which is already in the NAFTA free trade area), and their growth rate is likely to make this even 
more true. This is a contradiction the United States must resolve. While immediate negotiation 
of a Western hemisphere FT A is unlikely, a gradual, pragmatic, ad hoc approach in which 
subregional economic integration occurs first seems in the works. Indeed, it is probable that trade 
liberalization will move ahead more rapidly than within APEC. There apparently is a greater 
commitment to move ahead in Latin America; there are fewer cultural problems and probably a 
lesser sense of threat; and NAFTA may be easier to access. 
Outward-looking free trade areas such as NAFTA, AFT A, and the CER, as well as the 
APEC approach, can be complementary to global, multilateral liberalization. Countries may want 
to test themselves against smaller, neighboring economies before opening themselves to global 
competition (though in practice this has often been a dangerously inward-looking approach). 
They may initially be able to generate deeper or broader liberalization than global negotiations. 
They can serve as negotiating laboratories for new issues not yet addressed in the WTO or other 
global fora. Much depends on intent and political will. Indeed, with the proliferation of 
presumably outward-looking regional approaches to trade liberalization ~ APEC, the Free Trade 
12
 Jeffrey J. Schott, "From Bogor to Miami... and Beyond," Working Papers on Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation #95-2 (Washington: Institute for International Economics). 
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Area of the Americas, the very recent suggestion of an Atlantic free trade area encompassing the 
U.S. and the European Union — perhaps the world is in fact moving to a new global WTO round 
by the process of universal coverage of outward-looking regional free trade areas. 
Table 1. Northeast Asia Basic Economic Indicators, 1992 
TABLE 2. Northeast Asia: Bilateral Merchandise Trade Shares (1993, percent) 
